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Abstract
This paper considers the use of loyalty inducing discounts in vertical supply chains. An
upstream manufacturer and a competitive fringe sell di¤erentiated products to a retailer who
has private information about the level of stochastic demand. We provide a comparison
of market outcomes when the manufacturer uses two-part tari¤s (2PT), all-unit quantity
discounts (AU), and market share discounts (MS). We show that retailers risk attitude a¤ects
manufacturers preferences over these three pricing schemes. When the retailer is risk-neutral,
it bears all the risk and all three schemes lead to the same outcome. When the retailer is risk-
averse, 2PT performs the worst from manufacturers perspective but it leads to the highest
total surplus. For a wide range of parameter values (but not for all) the manufacturer prefers
MS to AU. By limiting the retailers product substitution possibilities MS makes the demand
for manufacturers product more inelastic. This reduces the amount (share of total prots)
the manufacturer needs to leave to the retailer for the latter to participate in the scheme.
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1 Introduction
A loyalty discount is the practice that implicitly or explicitly makes discounts conditional on
the share of a buyers purchases made from a supplier within a given period. The discount is
typically applied in a rollback format. Once a buyer qualies, it receives a discount not only
on those purchases above the target, but on all purchases in the period. In most cases, it is
di¢ cult to link these discount programs to particular instances of economies of scale. The latter
can occur at overall production level or in fullling a specic order, but are less likely to relate
to total purchases of a customer over a period. While loyalty inducing programs directed to
nal consumers have rarely raised competition concerns1, the use of rollback rebates in wholesale
markets has frequently come under antitrust scrutiny in recent years.2
Understanding the motives for the use of these rebates in business to business sales is valuable
for policy design. As with related practices of vertical price control and exclusive dealing, rms
use of loyalty discounts has the potential to be both procompetitive and anticompetitive. The
major concern with rollback loyalty rebates is that a supplier with substantial market power sets
a low price conditional on exclusive (or nearly exclusive) dealing, with the e¤ect that a market is
foreclosed to a rival competitor.3 However, this motive does not seem appropriate for all instances
where loyalty rebates are used as in some foreclosure is unlikely. Therefore, it is important to
recognize plausible mechanisms that motivate the use of loyalty discounts for reasons other than
exclusion. The impact of these practices on competition and welfare can be di¤erent depending
on the mechanisms that motivate their use.
The present article o¤ers an alternative motivation for dominant rms to o¤er certain loyalty
discount schemes. We assess the e¤ects of the various trading forms on competition and welfare
under demand uncertainty. These comparisons of alternative contracts between buyers and sup-
pliers are useful to identify the conditions that lead to the emergence of a specic type of rebate
or trading form and their respective e¤ects on the buyerswelfare. In particular, in this study
we focus on two-part tari¤s and two types of rollback discounts with quantity or market share
targets. We refer to the latter as all-unit quantity discounts (AU) and market share discounts
(MS), respectively.4 The focus of the paper is to understand how di¤erent risk attitudes for a
1Probably the best known are the frequent yer schemes promoted by airlines and related programs run by
supermarkets, cafés, bookstores, or credit card issuers.
2The case law related to loyalty inducing rebate programs has developed faster than the economic analysis of the
practices. Comprehensive overviews of relevant antitrust cases in US and Europe are presented in Mills (2010) and
the UK OFT report 804 (2005). See also Kobayashi (2005), European Commission (2005), European Commission
(2009), and Gual et al. (2005).
3Lately, European and North American case law have focused on whether loyalty discounts can serve as an
exclusionary device that would violate Article 102 of EC Treaty or Section 2 of the Sherman Act. In addition,
rmsuse of loyalty discounts in the distribution of their products has also been attacked as unlawful primary line
price discrimination under the Robinson Patman Act and EC law (Art. 102c).
4The term "all-unit" quantity discount is used to emphasize that we deal with rollback rebates. However, our
setting also informs on the relative private desirability of "incremental-unit" quantity discounts (that do not rollback
to inframarginal units once the target is reached) since they cannot improve upon 2PT under our information/risk
setting.
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buyer with private information about uncertainty a¤ect comparisons between these contracts.
In the analysis of vertical chains the tension between e¢ cient surplus extraction and max-
imization of surplus is thoroughly studied as a principal-agent problem where the retailer has
private information related to uncertainty. In contrast to the principle-agent literature where
di¤erent risk attitudes of the two parties play a central role, previous work that studies motives
for various pricing schemes assumes that both upstream and downstream rms are risk-neutral.
It is quite plausible that a manufacturer that deals with many retailers in di¤erent local markets
(potentially subject to uncorrelated shocks) behaves as risk-neutral. But, it is less likely that a
retailer would agree to bear all the market risk by signing a contract which aims to induce certain
level of purchases at no additional cost to the manufacturer. In e¤ect, our analysis suggests that
the di¤erences in attitude towards risk across the vertical chain can explain emergence of di¤erent
types of loyalty inducing contracts.
In this study, we show that in the presence of uncertainty, if the retailer is innitely risk
averse, the manufacturer strictly prefers market share and all-unit quantity discounts to two-
part tari¤s. Using a linear demand system, we also show that, for a wide range of parameters,
the manufacturer strictly prefers market share discounts to all-unit quantity discounts, and that
welfare is highest under two-part tari¤s. Private incentives for the use of market-share discounts
are driven by their ability to induce the retailer to act on a target share. This reduces the elasticity
of retailers demand for manufacturers product. However, while a market-share discount limits
substitution of the manufacturers product with the competing product, it still allows the retailer
to use private information and respond to actual market conditions which a¤ect both products.
Even if implementation of market-share discounts requires costly monitoring of rival sales, there
is a non-trivial range of costs for which the supplier might still strictly prefer using a market
share discount to using two-part tari¤s or all-unit quantity discounts. The importance of the
retailers risk attitude is indicated by the fact that, under risk neutrality, the manufacturer is
indi¤erent between two-part tari¤s, market share discounts, and all-unit quantity discounts. In
that case, the retailer can assume the entire market risk without requiring a compensation from
the manufacturer.
Despite the prevalence of loyalty discount schemes, the theoretical literature in economics
did not address them specically until recently. Most of economistsattention was captured by
related practices like exclusive dealing or incremental units discounts (see Bernheim andWhinston
(1998)). Recent research has identied some market conditions where the use of rollback discounts
improves surplus transfer from retailers to manufacturers.
Under complete information, Inderst and Sha¤er (2010) shows that market-share contracts
allow a dominant supplier to dampen competition between the retailers, extract more prot than
two-part tari¤s or own-supplier contracts do, and deliver the joint-prot maximizing outcome.
Hence, even absent exclusionary concerns, market share contracts may harm consumers. Marx
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and Sha¤er (2004) proposes a rent-shifting rationale for rollback quantity discounts when two
upstream sellers sequentially contract with one downstream rm. Surplus extraction is better if
contracts depend on both sellersquantities and exclusion is desirable only if the rival is ine¢ -
cient.5
Under asymmetric information, rollback discounts can be used to alleviate the adverse se-
lection problem. Majumdar and Sha¤er (2009) reports that by conditioning a discount on both
quantity and market share thresholds the manufacturer can improve upon rollback quantity dis-
counts. The share threshold reduces the retailers information rent by decreasing the attrac-
tiveness of concealing a high demand state. The authors identify a condition under which the
suggested contracts can replicate the full information outcome. Sloev (2008) explores dynamic in-
centives for the use of market share discounts and shows that they can be employed by a supplier
to induce retailers to exert the optimal promotional e¤ort level.6
The present study shows that, under incomplete information, the use of loyalty discounts
can increase the upstream prots when a risk neutral supplier o¤ers non-contingent contracts to
a risk averse retailer. There is a conict between exploitation of market power and providing
insurance to the retailer to secure contracting. From the sellers perspective the desirability of
di¤erent pricing schemes is determined by their ability to manage these conicting objectives. In
this setting, the preferences of the seller and the buyer over the various pricing schemes may not
be aligned. Our information setting is reminiscent of Rey and Tirole (1986). They point to the
delegation problem under uncertainty as an essential driver of private incentives to use vertical
restraints such as exclusive territories and resale price maintenance.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out the model and introduces
the contracts under full information. Section 3 analyzes the contracts in the presence of demand
uncertainty. First we analyze the relative performance of contracts when the retailer is risk averse,
and then when the retailer is risk neutral. Concluding remarks and directions for future research
are collected in the last section.
2 Model
Consider a vertically-related industry where a manufacturer and a competitive fringe operate
at the upstream level. The fringe produces an imperfect substitute of the product supplied by
the manufacturer. The manufacturer and the competitive fringe supply their products in many
independent and identical markets each served by a di¤erent retail monopoly.
We explore the relative performance of specic non-linear pricing contracts under uncertainty
5 In a full information setting where the incumbent faces second period competition by entrants, Feess and
Wohlschlegel (2010) shows that all unit discounts shift rents from the entrants. Greenlee, Reitman, and Sibley
(2008) considers a monopolist that faces competition in a second market and shows that bundled loyalty discounts
(that condition the rebate on the range of products purchased from the monopolist) have ambiguous welfare e¤ects.
6Kolay, Sha¤er, and Ordover (2004) shows that a discrete menu of rollback quantity discounts generates higher
upstream prots than a menu of two-part tari¤s in a bilateral monopoly setting, but its welfare e¤ects depend on
demand parameters.
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and risk aversion. In each local market, the retailer faces an uncertain demand. The retailer and
the manufacturer sign a contract prior to the resolution of the demand uncertainty. The order of
moves is as follows. First, the manufacturer o¤ers a contract to the retailer. If the retailer rejects,
it cannot sell the manufacturers good. Second, the demand is realized and the retailer chooses
the quantities for the two goods. Third, the retailer sells the products to the nal consumers at
market clearing prices. The manufacturer is assumed to be risk-neutral, as it operates in many
independent markets with uncorrelated shocks. The retailer can be either risk averse or risk
neutral.
We consider only non-contingent contracts which prevent arbitrage opportunities across local
markets. That is, we require that the manufacturers o¤er is such that in equilibrium the retailer
chooses to purchase at the same wholesale price regardless of the realized demand. If, alterna-
tively, the suppliers o¤er induced the retailer to buy at di¤erent wholesale prices for di¤erent
realizations of uncertainty, then retailers (in di¤erent markets) receiving di¤erent demand shocks
could protably trade with each other at the expense of the manufacturer.
In each local market, the retailer purchases the goods and resells them to the nal consumers
without incurring any additional costs. The retailer buys the competitively supplied product at
marginal cost. Prior to downstream nal quantity choices, the retailer and the manufacturer
sign a non-linear contract that stipulates the terms and conditions of purchase. We examine
three types of contracts: standard two-part tari¤s, all-unit quantity discounts, and market share
discounts. All specify a unit price (w) and a non-negative franchise fee (F ). An all-unit quantity
discount contract o¤ers a rebate o¤-the-list price for all the units purchased once a quantity
threshold is met. Also, a market share discount contract o¤ers a rebate for all units bought if
purchases meet a required threshold. However, the threshold is structured di¤erently, a share of
retailers purchases must be made from the manufacturer in order to qualify for the rebate.
A retailer who signs a standard two-part tari¤ (2PT) contract pays to the manufacturer
C2PT (q1) = wq1 + F for purchasing a quantity q1  0: An all-unit quantity discount (AU)
contract stipulates two wholesale prices (wH > wL) and a quantity target (qT ) to qualify for the
lower price. Then, the payment to the manufacturer is
CAU (q1) =
8<: wHq1 + F if q1 < qT1wLq1 + F if q1  qT1 :
A market-share discount (MS) contract stipulates two wholesale prices (wH > wL) and a share
target,  2 (0; 1). The payment with this contract is
CMS (q1) =
8<: wHq1 + F if q1 < (q1 + q2)wLq1 + F if q1  (q1 + q2) ;
where q2 is the quantity of the competitively supplied product.
Marginal costs of production for both products are assumed to be zero. The inverse demand
system for the di¤erentiated goods faced by a retailer is given by P1(q; ) and P2(q; ), where
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q = (q1; q2) is the vector of chosen quantities. Pi(q) 2 C1 and @Pi=@qi < 0 whenever Pi(q) > 0
for i = 1; 2. The parameter  is a discrete random variable which captures potential demand
uncertainty common to both products. It takes with probability p a low value (L) and with
probability 1  p a high value (H). Let E() be the expectation of  and Pi(0; L) > 0: Shocks
in di¤erent downstream markets are assumed to be iid.
A retailer chooses q1 and q2 to maximize its prots, (q; ) = R(q; )   wq1   F; where
R(q; ) = P1(q; )q1 + P2(q; )q2 is its revenue. For a given w; (q) 2 C2 is strictly concave
and submodular (@2=@q1@q2 < 0). The retailers outside option consists of selling only the
competitively supplied variety. Then, if the retailer rejects the manufacturers o¤er, it chooses q2
to maximize RO(q2; ) = P2(0; q2; )q2: Let RO() be the maximal prot of a retailer that only
sells good 2.
A risk neutral retailer accepts to sign the contract if its expected prot exceeds the expected
value of its outside option. In contrast, an innitely risk averse retailer signs the contract only
if its prots under the low (worst) demand realization ( = L) are higher than or equal to the
value of the outside option for that demand scenario.
Under a deterministic demand the objectives of the manufacturer in designing a vertical
contract are maximization of the surplus in the vertical chain and surplus extraction. Market
power in vertical chains may lead to a conict between surplus maximization and extraction.
Surplus maximization might fail due to double marginalization. Two part tari¤s are an e¢ cacious
way to avoid this problem, the product is passed downstream at upstream marginal cost and rent
is extracted through the franchise fee. With deterministic demand, two-part tari¤s and discounts
based on quantity or market share thresholds dened as above are all equally e¤ective tools of
replicating the integrated rms solution. The proof of the following result is straightforward and
therefore omitted.7
Proposition 1 With deterministic demand, two part tari¤, all-unit quantity discount and market
share discount contracts are equivalent both from manufacturers and social planners viewpoints.
They all maximize surplus in the vertical chain.
3 Contracts under Demand Uncertainty
3.1 Risk-Averse Retailer
Our main focus is to understand how the relative performance of the di¤erent contracts is a¤ected
by retailers risk attitude.8 We start with the case of a risk averse retailer. With demand
uncertainty and retailer risk aversion, vertical contracts need to cater for an additional objective:
7 In the Appendix we prove a similar equivalence result in the case with uncertainty and a risk-neutral retailer.
The deterministic demand version of the result can be recovered from that result by substituting p=1.
8Section 3.3 shows that the relative performance of these contracts under uncertainty is still the same when the
retailers are risk neutral.
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insurance provision to the retailers. Achieving this objective undermines contracts ability to
eliminate the tension between surplus maximization and extraction.
An innitely risk averse retailer only accepts a contract that under a low demand realization
guarantees that its prots are weakly greater than its outside option. This requirement implies
that under high demand the manufacturer cannot absorb all surplus via the franchise fee and
any attempt to extract more from the retailer requires a wholesale price above the marginal cost.
Consequently, the unit price charged exceeds the level that maximizes surplus in the vertical
chain. Intuitively, for a given probability p, a larger di¤erence H   L makes the retailers
participation constraint more restrictive and increases the manufacturers need to absorb surplus
via the unit price. So, the fact that a risk averse retailer requires some insurance to sign the
contract, leads to double marginalization even when two-part tari¤s are used.
Under a standard two part tari¤, the retailer chooses q1 and q2 to maximize
2PT = P1(q; )q1 + P2(q; )q2   wq1   F:
The optimal output choices, q1(w; ) and q2(w; ); satisfy the rst-order conditions:
@P1
@q1
q1 +
@P2
@q1
q2 + P1 = w (1)
@P1
@q2
q1 +
@P2
@q2
q2 + P2 = 0: (2)
Let R(w; ) = R(q1; q2; ) be the optimal second stage revenue. Concavity and submodularity of
retailers prots imply that @q1=@w2PT < 0 and @q2=@w2PT > 0: With a two-part tari¤, double
marginalization makes the retailer substitute away from manufacturers product in favor of the
competitively supplied variety.
The upstream manufacturer sets w2PT and F2PT to maximize
U2PT = pw2PT q

1(w2PT ; L) + (1  p)w2PT q1(w2PT ; H) + F2PT
subject to R(w2PT ; L)  w2PT q1(w2PT ; L)  F2PT  RO(L)  0:
Notice that the outside option (RO) is independent of w2PT and the maximand is increasing in
F2PT ; thus the constraint binds at the optimum. By the envelope theorem, (1) and (2) imply
that the optimal unit price (w2PT ) satises
(1  p)(q1(w2PT ; H)  q1(w2PT ; L) + w2PT
@q1(H)
@w
) =  pw2PT
@q1(L)
@w
: (3)
Manufacturers prots with the optimal 2PT are given by:
U2PT = pw

2PT q

1(w

2PT ; L) + (1  p)w2PT q1(w2PT ; H) (4)
+R(w2PT ; L)  w2PT q1(w2PT ; L) RO(L):
If a rollback discount does not induce the retailer to act on the threshold, then retailers
quantity choices are still governed by (1) and (2). Thus, a rollback discount can improve upon a
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2PT only by inducing the retailer to act on the threshold. If a retailer facing an all-unit quantity
discount acts on the threshold, then it optimizes by choosing the quantity of the competitively
supplied product to be sold along with the threshold quantity for the manufacturers product.
For example, if the scheme induces the retailer to act on the target when demand is low, then
bq2(qT1 ; L) = maxq2 (R(qT1 ; q2; L)  wLqT1   F )
where qT1 is the quantity threshold that qualies for the discounted unit price wL: Let bR(qT1 ; )
denote the optimal second stage revenue when the retailer sells qT1 units of the manufacturers
product.
Next proposition establishes that when the retailer is innitely risk-averse there exists an all-
unit quantity discount that the manufacturer strictly prefers to the optimal 2PT. In particular,
the manufacturer can make the retailer buy the same quantity as in the optimal 2PT at a higher
price when demand is low.
Proposition 2 With demand uncertainty and an innitely risk-averse retailer, the manufacturer
strictly prefers all-unit quantity discount contract to two-part tari¤ contract.
Proof. With an all-unit quantity discount that induces only the low type to act on the threshold,
suppliers prots are
UAU ( bwAU ; qT1 ) = p bwAUqT1 + (1  p) bwAUq1( bwAU ; H) + bR(qT1 ; L)  bwAUqT1  RO(L):
Consider now the all-unit quantity discount that o¤ers the rebated price bwAU = w2PT if q1 
qT1 = q

1(w

2PT ; L) and a fee FAU = R
(w2PT ; L)   w2PT q1(w2PT ; L)   RO(L): Notice that
UAU (w

2PT ; q

1(w

2PT ; L)) = U

2PT (the RHS is dened above in 4). This all-unit discount induces
only the low type to act on the threshold so that the marginal variation in suppliers prots when
increasing w evaluated at bwAU is given below. Note that, by charging a very high price when
the retailer buys less than q1(w2PT ; L); the manufacturer can guarantee that the retailer keeps
buying q1(w2PT ; L) when demand is low for a small increase in bwAU .
@UAU
@w
= (1  p)(q1(w2PT ; H)  q1(w2PT ; L) + w2PT
@q1(H)
@w
): (5)
By (3) it follows that
@UAU
@w
=  pw2PT
@q1(L)
@w
> 0:
Then, there exists  > 0 such that UAU (w2PT + ; q

1(w

2PT ; L)) > U

2PT .
The proof shows that there is an all-unit quantity discount scheme that induces the low-type to
buy the same amount as in the optimal two-part tari¤ and increases the manufacturers expected
prots compared to the two-part tari¤. Note that the all-unit quantity discount contract used
in this proof induces the retailer to act on the threshold quantity only when the demand is low.
Indeed the optimal AU contract has this form. For any AU contract that induces the retailer
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to act on the threshold both when demand is low and when demand is high, there exist an AU
contract that induces the retailer to act on the threshold only when the demand is low which
provides higher expected prots to the manufacturer.
Let us now consider market share discount contacts. With this type of contract, the retailer
qualies for a price discount if at least a percentage  of its purchases are made from the manu-
facturer. If such a contract induces the retailer to act on the share target, it limits the retailers
substitution of the manufacturers product with the competitively supplied alternative in response
to an increase in price. This reduces the market for substitutes of manufacturers product and
allows it to charge a higher unit price as elasticity of the retailers demand falls.
A retailer that acts exactly on the share threshold chooses q1 and q2 to maximize:
P1(q; )q1 + P2(q; )q2   wq1   F;
subject to q1 = (q1 + q2):
Let s = =(1   ) (note that  2 (0; 1) ) s < 1), then the constraint requires that q1 = sq2:
Substituting the constraint, it follows that for a retailer that acts exactly on the threshold, the
quantity of good 2, q2 (w; s; ); maximizes:
MS = P1(sq2; q2; )sq2 + P2(sq2; q2; )q2   wsq2   F:
The rst order condition of the maximization problem is:
@P1
@q1
s2q2 +
@P1
@q2
sq2 + (P1   w)s+
@P2
@q1
sq2 +
@P2
@q2
q2 + P2 = 0: (6)
Proposition 3 With demand uncertainty and an innitely risk-averse retailer, the manufacturer
strictly prefers rollback market share discount contract to two-part tari¤ contract.
Proof. With a market-share discount that induces only the low type to act on the threshold,
manufacturers prots are
UMS = pwsq

2 (w; s; L) + (1  p)wq1(w; H) + FMS :
Let s2PT = q1(w2PT ; L)=q

2(w

2PT ; L) and notice that s2PT q

2 (w

2PT ; s2PT ; L) = q

1(L): Con-
sider a market-share discount that o¤ers the rebated price bwMS = w2PT if s  s2PT and a fee
FMS = R
(w2PT ; L)   w2PT q1(w2PT ; L)   RO(L): Then, UMS( bwMS ; s2PT ) = U2PT (the RHS
is given in 4). The marginal variation in supplier prots when increasing w evaluated at bwMS is
given by
@UMS
@w
= (1 p)(q1(w2PT ; H) s2PT q2 (w2PT ; s2PT ; L))+(1 p)w2PT (
@q1(H)
@w
 s2PT @q

2 (L)
@w
):
It follows by (3) that
@UMS
@w
=  w2PT s2PT
@q2 (L)
@w
=  w2PT
@q1(L)
@w
> 0:
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Then, there exists  > 0 such that UMS(w2PT + ; s2PT ) > U

2PT .
The proof of Proposition 3 shows that there exists a MS contract that results in higher
upstream prots than the optimal 2PT. The proof uses an MS contract which induces the retailer
to act on the threshold only when the demand is low. However, this is not necessarily true for the
optimal MS contract. In the linear demand example presented below, the optimal MS contract
actually induces both types to act on the share threshold. Notice that a retailer acting on a share
target still makes use of its private information on demand. By correctly adjusting its purchases
of the competitively supplied product it can meet the threshold while allowing its choices to
respond to uncertainty.
The manufacturer prefers MS contracts to 2PT because setting a share threshold limits prod-
uct substitution and makes retailers demand for its product more inelastic. Lower price-elasticity
allows the manufacturer to charge a higher unit-price and transfer more surplus upstream, so that
retailers participation constraint is met at a lower cost.
A similar e¤ect is in operation under an AU contract when the demand realization is low.
With low demand the retailer facing the optimal AU contract purchases at the threshold level
for any price leading the e¤ective elasticity of the retailers demand for manufacturers product
to fall to zero. However, when demand is high, under the optimal AU contract the retailers
purchases of the manufacturers product is above the threshold level and there is no reduction
in the elasticity of retailers demand for manufacturers product. Then, increasing the wholesale
price decreases the volume of retailers purchases from the manufacturer faster relative to the
optimal MS contract. In summary, elasticity of the retailers demand for the manufacturers
product is higher under a MS contract than under an AU contract when demand is low, but the
opposite is true when the demand is high. In the linear demand example below we derive closed
form solutions to illustrate the relative desirability of the three pricing schemes (2PT contract,
AU contract and MS contract) from the manufacturers perspective and also examine the social
incentives for their use.
3.2 Linear Demand Example: Contract Comparison and Welfare Analysis
Let the preferences of the representative consumer be given by a quadratic utility,
U(q1; q2) = (a+ )q1 + (a+ )q2   1
2
(q21 + 2q1q2 + q
2
2);
where  2 (0; 1) measures product di¤erentiation. Then, the inverse demand functions are given
by9:
Pi(qi; qj) = a+    qi   qj for i; j = 1; 2 with i 6= j:
Let us consider rst a two-part tari¤ contract. The optimal second stage quantity and prots
are given by:
9See, for instance, Vives (2001).
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q1 =
(1  )(a+ )  w
2(1  2) and q

2 =
(1  )(a+ ) + w
2(1  2) ; (7)
 =
2(1  )a(a  w) + w2
4(1  2) + 
2a  w
2(1 + )
+ 2
1
2(1 + )
  F;
where  2 fL; Hg: The retailers outside option is RO() = (a + )2=4 and its participation
constraint in this case requires that (L)  RO(L).
Manufacturers equilibrium choices and prots are, respectively:
w2PT = (1  )(1  p)(H   L), F 2PT =
(1  )[a  (1  p)(H   L) + L)]2
4(1 + )
; and
U2PT =
(1  )[(a+ L)2 + (1  )(1  p)2(H   L)2]
4(1 + )
:
In the Appendix we summarize the equilibrium outcomes when the retailer is innitely risk
averse in the linear demand example.
Consider now an all-unit quantity discount contract. It can be shown that the optimal AU
contract induces only the low type to act on threshold, while the high type purchases above the
threshold. The optimal second stage revenue of the low type retailer is
bR(qT1 ; L) = (a+ L)24   (1  2)(qT1 )2 + (1  )(a+ L)qT1 .
The participation constraint is binding and, in equilibrium,
qT1 =
(a+ L)(1 + p)  (1  p)(H   L)
2(1 + )(1 + p)
; wAU =
(1  )(H   L)
1 + p
and
F AU =
(1  )[a  (H   2L)]2
4(1 + )
+
p(1  )(H   L)[a  (H   2L)]
2(1 + )(1 + p)
:
As in the case of a 2PT contract, risk aversion and the related insurance provision to the
retailer raise the wholesale price above the level that maximizes total surplus. However, although
the wholesale price involves a higher mark-up than in the case of a 2PT contract (wAU > w2PT ),
when demand is low, the retailer purchases more of manufacturers product than under a 2PT
contract due to the incentives provided by the mechanism.10 Then, the manufacturer is able to
absorb more surplus and make higher prots than under a 2PT contract,
UAU =
(1  )(1 + p)(a+ L)2 + (1  )(1  p)(H   L)2
4(1 + )(1 + p)
:
However, expected total welfare and consumer surplus are lower under an AU contract than
under a 2PT contract,
WAU  W2PT =  (1  p)(1  )p
2(2 + 3p)(H   L)2
8(1 + p)2(1 + )
< 0 and
CSAU   CS2PT =  (1  )p
2(2  p  p2)(H   L)2
8(1 + p)2(1 + )
< 0:
10The opposite is true when demand is high as the threshold in the optimal AU contract does not constrain the
retailers choice there. If the manufacturer designed a contract that constrains both types, then it would make
upstream prots UAU = (1   )(a + L)2=4(1 + ). Note that UAU < U2PT < UAU : For UAU to be well-dened
there must be relatively little uncertainty.
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There are two underlying e¤ects behind this welfare comparison. First, when demand is low
the distortion in the retailers sales due to double marginalization is lower under the optimal
AU contract because sales of the manufacturers good are determined by the threshold rather
than the rst order condition.11 Second, the higher wholesale price increases the negative welfare
impact of double marginalization when demand is high and the retailers sales are governed by
the rst order condition.12 The second e¤ect is stronger leading expected welfare to be lower
with optimal AU contract than with optimal 2PT contract.13
Finally, let us consider a market share discount. A retailer acting exactly on the market share
threshold chooses optimally only the quantity of the competitively supplied product.14 That is,
q2 =
a+  + s(a+    w)
2(1 + 2s+ s2)
and  (w;F; ) =
[a+  + s(a+    w)]2
4(1 + 2s+ s2)
  F:
The optimal MS contract induces both types to act on the share threshold and choose optimally
only the quantity of the competitively supplied product. The supplier chooses w; s and F to
maximize
wMSs
a+ E() + s(a+ E()  wMS)
2(1 + 2s+ s2)
+ FMS subject to  (wMS ; FMS ; L)  (a+ L)
2
4
:
The constraint is binding, and it follows that in equilibrium,
sMS = 1; w

MS = 2(1  p)(H   L) and
F MS =
[a+ L   (1  p)(H   L)]2
2(1 + )
  (a+ L)
2
4
:
As in the case of two-part tari¤ contract and all-unit quantity discount contract, the partic-
ipation constraint of the risk averse retailer leads to a wholesale price above upstream marginal
cost. The resulting upstream prots are given by
UMS =
(1  )(a+ L)2 + 2(1  p)(H   L)2
4(1 + )
:
Expected total welfare and expected consumer surplus are lower under MS discounts than
under 2PT:
WMS  W2PT =  1
8
(1  p)(H   L)[2(a+ L) + 3(1  p)(H   L)] < 0 and
CSMS   CS2PT =  1
8
(1  p)(H   L)[2(a+ L) + (1  p)(H   L)] < 0:
11When demand is low, under the AU contract, the retailer optimizes by choosing the quantity of the competi-
tively supplied good corresponding to the threshold quantity of the manufacturers good, and although the sales are
still distorted in favor of the competitively supplied good the distortion is lower as 1 < q2(w

AU ; 
L)=q1(w

AU ; 
L)
< q2(w

2PT ; 
L)=q1(w

2PT ; 
L):
12When demand is high, for both contracts the retailers choices are governed by the rst order conditions and
the distortion in relative sales of the two goods is higher with the optimal AU contract q2(w

AU ; 
H)=q1(w

AU ; 
H)
> q2(w

2PT ; 
H)=q1(w

2PT ; 
H) > 1:
13Expected total welfare is computed as the probability weighted sum of the representative consumers utility,
and the aggregate retailer and manufacturer prots under the optimal contracts in the two demand states.
14When acting on the share threshold, the retailer actually chooses optimally the purchases of only one product.
The purchases of the substitute product are determined by the share requirement. Without loss of generality, we
let the retailer choose the quantity of the competitively supplied product (q2):
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Proposition 4 Under demand uncertainty, with an innitely risk-averse retailer and linear de-
mand, expected total welfare and consumer surplus are highest under 2PT contract. Expected
consumer surplus is lowest under MS contract. For p2 < (1 + )=2; from both private and social
viewpoints, MS contract outperforms AU contract.
The intuition underlying Proposition 4 is related to the delegation problem (see, for instance,
Rey and Tirole (1986)). Under uncertainty the manufacturer pursues to exploit market power in
the vertical chain and to o¤er insurance to the risk-averse retailer. In our model, the fact that the
retailer is a multiproduct rm a¤ects both upstream objectives. An integrated monopolist can
exploit market power optimally in the vertical structure. It passes the product downstream at
marginal cost and, under uncertainty, it chooses qV I1 = q
V I
2 = (a+)=[2(1+)]: The retail quantity
responds to the uncertainty, and the share of manufacturers product is constant across states.
The vertically integrated share of manufacturers product is V I = 50% (= qV I1 =(q
V I
1 + q
V I
2 )):
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When dealing with a risk averse retailer, the manufacturer cannot extract the incremental
surplus from the retailer through the franchise fee as the retailer requires insurance from market
risk, and is forced to sell its product above marginal cost. With a 2PT contract, the retailer
chooses quantities q2PT1 < q
V I
1 and q
2PT
2 > q
V I
2 that respond to the uncertainty.
16 Due to
the higher unit price, the share of manufacturers product is lower, 2PT () = q2PT1 =(q
2PT
1 +
q2PT2 ) < 50% (and varies across states, 
2PT (L) < 
2PT (H)), as the retailer purchases more
of the substitute product. Under the low demand, the AU contract induces the retailer to act
on threshold. This limits retailers ability to cut down the share of manufacturers product
when facing low demand (AU (L) = qT1 =(q
T
1 + q
AU
2 ) > 
2PT (L)). But, it comes at a cost, as
AU (H) < 
2PT (H):
Finally, a MS contract allows the retailers choices to respond to the uncertainty, while at the
same time it prevents the retailer from buying more of the substitute product when confronted
with a higher unit price for the manufacturers product, qMS1 = q
MS
2 = [a +    (1   p)(H  
L)]=2(1 + ): Although, qMS1 = q
2PT
1 ; retailers demand for manufacturers product is more
inelastic at levels above the threshold and this allows the manufacturer to absorb more surplus
by charging a higher wholesale price. Insurance provision prevents the manufacturer from passing
the product downstream at marginal cost and this causes a loss of e¢ ciency. However, a share-
based target allows him to restore the vertically integrated share of purchases: MS = 50% for
both demand realizations.
3.3 Risk-Neutral Retailer
When contracting with a risk neutral retailer, the manufacturer designs the contracts to maximize
the surplus in the vertical chain and absorb the rents upstream. A risk neutral retailer is willing
15The linear demand example presented here rules out vertical di¤erentiation. Due to this symmetry, the share
of purchases is 50%.
16Note that, q2PT1 = q

1(w

2PT ; ) = [a+   (1  p)(H   L)]=[2(1+)] and q2PT2 = q2(w2PT ; ) = [a+ +(1 
p)(H   L)]=[2(1 + )]:
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to bear all market risk. So, in this case there is no conict between surplus extraction incentives
and insurance provision. Then, the manufacturer passes the product to the retailer at marginal
cost (wRN = 0) and appropriates surplus through the franchise fee that is equal to retailers
expected prot net of its outside option (FRN = E(R(0; ))   E(RO())). Two-part tari¤s,
all-unit quantity discounts, and rollback market share discounts are all equally e¤ective tools to
maximize and extract surplus in the vertical chain.
Proposition 5 With demand uncertainty and a risk-neutral retailer, the manufacturer is indif-
ferent between two-part tari¤s, market-share, and all-unit discounts. Private and social incentives
are aligned.
The proof of this result is presented in the Appendix together with a linear demand example.
As the contracts are outcome-equivalent, the welfare result directly follows. All contracts generate
the same consumer surplus. The retailers incremental prot is strictly positive under a positive
shock, but the retailer makes losses when demand is low. If the implementation of a market share
contract requires the manufacturer to monitor at a cost the quantities chosen by the retailer, then
this contract should not be observed in related environments when the retailer is risk neutral.
4 Conclusions and Extensions
We have shown that the risk attitude of the retailers plays a role in an upstream manufacturers
choice of contracts and loyalty discounts. In vertical relations, manufacturers preference over the
contracts is a¤ected by their rent extraction and risk sharing properties. This result carries over
to the case of loyalty rebate schemes. In a setting where an upstream manufacturer competes
with a competitive fringe, a novel driver of our results is a contracts ability to a¤ect product
substitution. A market share contract that induces a buyer to act on the share threshold limits
retailers ability to substitute away from manufacturers product when facing a relatively higher
unit price. In addition, a market share contract provides a higher degree of exibility to the
retailer due to the fact that an absolute share threshold is achievable at many di¤erent quantity
levels. The retailer can still obtain the discount in a bad season as all of its sales would be low.
When the retailer is risk averse, this allows the manufacturer to guarantee the participation to
the contract at a lower cost than in a two-part tari¤ and, for a wide range of parameters, than in
an all-unit quantity discount. However, there is a conict between social and private incentives
for the use of di¤erent contracts as total welfare and consumer surplus are highest under two-part
tari¤s.
When the retailer is risk-neutral the ability to charge a higher wholesale price does not play a
role. The retailer bears all the risk and buys the product at marginal cost. The manufacturer and
the social planner are indi¤erent between two-part tari¤s, all unit quantity, and rollback market
share discounts.
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Amongst possible extensions are generalizations in three directions. The two products sold by
the retailer may eventually be vertically di¤erentiated. It is interesting to see if the results extend
to more general downward sloping demand functions, or to more general utility functions of the
risk averse retailer. So far, we concentrated on non-contingent contracts (used in many identical
and independent retail markets where the manufacturer operates). However, such contract com-
parison might shed light on the use of loyalty rebates also when the contracts are contingent on
demand realizations.
5 Appendix
5.1 Risk-Neutral Retailer
Proof of Proposition 5. With uncertain demand, the risk-neutral retailer makes quantity
choices after observing the realized demand. Hence, the second stage optimizations presented in
subsection 3.1 still apply. But, since contracts are agreed upon before the resolution of uncertainty,
a di¤erent risk attitude changes the rst stage optimization. When the manufacturer faces a risk
neutral retailer, the participation constraint requires retailers expected prot to be at least equal
to retailers expected outside option.
Under a 2PT contract, the upstream manufacturer chooses w and F to maximize
pwq1(w; L) + (1  p)wq1(w; H) + F subject to
p(R(w; L)  wq1(w; L)) + (1  p)(R(w; H)  wq1(w; H))  F  pRO(L) + (1  p)RO(H):
The constraint is increasing in the franchise fee so the supplier chooses the unit price to maximize
pR(w; L)+ (1  p)R(w; H): It follows that the optimal unit price wRN satises the rst order
condition
p(
@R(L)
@q1
@q1(L)
@w
+
@R(L)
@q2
@q2(L)
@w
) + (1  p)(@R(H)
@q1
@q1(H)
@w
+
@R(H)
@q2
@q2(H)
@w
) = 0: (8)
Using (1), (2), and envelope theorem, (8) becomes pwRN (@q1(L)=@w)+(1 p)wRN (@q1(HL)=@w) =
0; and (@q1()=@w) < 0 implies that, in equilibrium,
wRN = 0 and FRN = E(R
(0; ))  E(RO()): (9)
Let us consider an AU contract which induces the retailer to act on the quantity target only
under a low demand. Then, the supplier chooses w; qT1 and F to maximize
pwqT1 + (1  p)wq1(w; H) + F subject to
p( bR(qT1 ; L)  wqT1 ) + (1  p)(R(w; H)  wq1(w; H))  F  pRO(L) + (1  p)RO(H):
The constraint is increasing in the franchise fee, so the supplier chooses w and qT1 to maximize
p bR(qT1 ; L) + (1   p)R(w; H): It follows that the optimal unit price wRN satises the rst
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order condition (1   p)(@R(H)@q1
@q1(H)
@w +
@R(H)
@q2
@q2(H)
@w ) = 0: By a similar argument as in the
case of a 2PT, it follows that the optimal unit price and franchise fee are given by (9). In
addition, qT1 = argmax p bR(qT1 ; L) = q1(0; L): Clearly the manufacturer cannot improve upon
this contract. The optimal 2PT and AU contracts result in the same output levels.
Finally, consider a MS contract that induces the retailer to act on the threshold always. Then,
the supplier chooses w; s and F to maximize
pwsq2 (w; s; L) + (1  p)wsq2 (w; s; H) + F subject to
p(R(w; s; L)  wsq2 (w; s; L)) + (1  p)(R(w; s; H)  wsq2 (w; s; H))  F 
pRO(L) + (1  p)RO(H):
The constraint is increasing in the franchise fee, so the supplier chooses w and s to maximize
pR(w; s; L) + (1  p)R(w; s; H): Then, the unit price satises
p(
@R
@q1
s
@q2 (L)
@w
+
@R
@q2
@q2 (L)
@w
) + (1  p)( @R
@q1
s
@q2 (H)
@w
+
@R
@q2
@q2 (H)
@w
) = 0: (10)
From (6), using envelope theorem, (10) becomes p(@q2 (L)=@w)sw+(1 p)(@q2 (H)=@w)sw = 0:
Then, the optimal unit price and franchise fee are given by (9). Again, the quantities purchased
by the retailer at equilibrium are the same as in the optimal 2Pt contract and the manufacturers
expected prot is the same. We conclude that the manufacturer is indi¤erent between these
contracts and the same level of aggregate welfare is obtained under all three contracts.
5.2 Closed-Form Solutions with Linear Demand
Using the linear demand specication presented in subsection 3.2, we can derive closed-form
solutions for the quantities and prices of the two products (qi and Pi for i 2 f1; 2g), retailers prot
(R), manufacturers prot (U), welfare (W ), and consumer surplus (CS) for all contracts. Table
1 and 2 present the equilibrium outcomes under uncertainty when the retailer is, respectively,
risk-neutral and risk-averse.
Table 1: Uncertainty and Risk Neutrality
Contract 2PT AU MS
q1 = q2
a+
2(1+)
P1 = P2
a+
2
R
RL =   (1 )(1 p)(H L)(2a+L+H)4(1+) + (a+L)
2
4
RH =
(1 )p(H L)(2a+L+)
4(1+) +
(a+H)
2
4
w 0
F = U (1 )[(1 p)(a+H)
2+p(a+L)
2]
4(1+)
E(CS) p(a+L)
2+(1 p)(a+H)2
4(1+)
E(W ) 3[p(a+L)
2+(1 p)(a+H)2]
4(1+)
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